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Abstract 
Using data on U.S. universities, we show that universities that give higher royalty shares to faculty 
scientists generate greater license income, controlling for university size, academic quality, research 
funding and other factors. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the potential 
endogeneity of royalty shares. We find that scientists respond both to cash royalties and to royalties 
used to support their research labs, suggesting both pecuniary and intrinsic (research) motivations. 
The incentive effects appear to be larger in private universities than in public ones, and we provide 
survey evidence indicating this may be related to differences in the use of performance pay, 
government constraints, and local development objectives of technology license offices. Royalty 
incentives work both by raising faculty effort and sorting scientists across universities. The effect of 
incentives works primarily by increasing the quality (value) rather than the quantity of inventions.  
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1 Introduction
Universities are an important source of technical change. By the end of the 1990s, they ac-
counted for about 50 percent of basic research in the U.S. (National Science Board, 2000).
Academic research has real e¤ects by increasing productivity growth in the economy and stim-
ulating greater private sector R&D through spillovers (Ja¤e, 1989; Adams, 1990). In addition,
university research contributes to the economy through the licensing of the resulting inven-
tions to private rms.1 Technology licensing activity has grown dramatically in the past two
decades.2 The number of U.S. patents awarded to university inventors increased from 500 in
1982 to more than 3,100 in 1998. The number of licenses more than tripled during the 1990s,
and license revenues increased from $186 million to about $1.3 billion. It is important to un-
derstand what drives academic research and technology licensing activity. It is widely accepted
in the literature that academics respond to non-pecuniary incentives, such as peer recognition
and advancement of science (Dasgupta and David, 1987, 1994), but is it a purely intellectual
pursuit, or do monetary incentives also matter?
In this paper we take a rst step to answer this question by providing econometric
evidence which suggests that high-powered, pecuniary incentives strongly a¤ect university re-
search and licensing outcomes. We examine how cash ow rights from university inventions
(the share of license royalties received by academic inventors) a¤ect the licensing income gen-
erated by universities. In the United States, university intellectual property policies always
grant the university exclusive (rst refusal) control rights over inventions, but the royalty in-
come is shared between the inventor and the university according to specied royalty sharing
schedules. We show that there is substantial variation in these royalty sharing arrangements
1There is substantial evidence of R&D spillovers (e.g., Ja¤e, 1989; Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2002; Adams,
1990). University research spillovers tend to be geographically localized as might be expected if direct knowl-
edge transfers are important (Ja¤e, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993; Audretsch and Stephan, 1996). There
is also a growing empirical literature on university patenting and technology transfer (e.g., Henderson, Ja¤e
and Trajtenberg, 1998; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Siegel, Waldman and Link, 2003) and university research
productivity (Adams and Griliches, 1998).
2Part of this rapid growth in university innovation and licensing activity is due to the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980 (Patent and Trademarks Amendments Act, PL 965-17) which gave universities the right to
patent and a mandate to license discoveries made with federally sponsored research to the private sector. By the
year 2000, nearly all American research universities had established, or expanded, technology licensing o¢ ces
and introduced explicit intellectual property policies and royalty sharing arrangements for academic scientists.
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across universities, and use this cross-sectional variation to estimate the e¤ect of royalty sharing
arrangements on license income.
To address the potentially serious problem of endogeneity of royalty shares that can
arise from unobserved heterogeneity across universities, we use pre-sample information on the
universitys patenting activity to proxy for the universitys xed e¤ect (following the approach
developed by Blundell, Gri¢ th and van Reenen, 1999). It would be more convincing if we
could control for xed university e¤ects, but there is not su¢ cient variation over time in the
royalty sharing arrangements to permit this. While the pre-sample patent control is very
signicant and works in the expected direction, one cannot rule out the possibility that there
is some remaining unobserved heterogeneity. It is important to recognise that there are some
fundamental limitations to what can be said with the available data. To reach more denitive
conclusions, we would need more time series variation in royalty shares than is available in our
sample, or instrumental variables that a¤ect royalty shares but not license income. We are
not aware of the existence of such instruments and developing them would require a deeper
institutional understanding of how universities determine their royalty sharing arrangements.
We develop a simple model in which a scientist makes three types of research e¤ort:
basic research, applied research devoted to starting new projects, and applied research to
improve the quality of each project. Basic research generates scientic publications. The
applied research e¤orts generate two types of outputs, projects with commercial value and
scientic publications. This characterisation is based on the argument that scientic research
is often dual-purpose, frequently referred to in the literature as Pasteurs Quadrant (e.g.
Stokes, 1992; Murry and Stern, 2006). Scientists value both publications and royalty income.
We develop su¢ cient conditions under which (all three types of) e¤orts are increasing in the
inventor royalty share. Thus the model predicts that a rise in the inventor royalty share of a
university increases its license revenues. We also allow for royalty incentives to a¤ect the sorting
of more productive scientists to universities. This sorting mechanism predicts that a rise in
the royalty shares of competing universitiesreduces the license revenue for the university:We
test these predictions with university-level data from the Association of University Technology
Managers, combined with information on the distribution of royalty shares which we collected
from university websites.
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There are three key empirical ndings. First, royalty shares a¤ect the level of license
income generated by universities. Controlling for other factors, including university size, qual-
ity, R&D funding, scientic composition, and local demand conditions, universities with higher
royalty shares generate higher levels of license income. This nding is important because it
means that the design of intellectual property rights, and other forms of incentives, in academic
institutions can have real e¤ects on growth and productivity. Second, the incentive e¤ects of
royalty shares appear to work both through the e¤ort and sorting channels. Third, the response
to incentives is much stronger (and more signicant) in private universities than in public ones.
Under a Betrandassumption that universities do not expect a strategic reaction from
their competitors, we nd that in most private universities, and in about half the public ones,
the incentive e¤ect is strong enough to produce a La¤er e¤ect, where raising the inventors
royalty share would increase the license revenue retained by the university (net of payments to
inventors). However, if universities expect competitors to match changes in their royalty share,
this La¤er e¤ect holds for a much smaller subset of universities.
We also show that technology licensing o¢ ces (TLOs) are more productive in private
universities, on average, suggesting that private institutions have more e¤ective, commercially-
oriented technology transfer activity. We argue that di¤erences in TLO e¤ectiveness help
explain why there is a larger response to royalty incentives in private universities. Because
universities retain the control rights over inventions, the TLO has exclusive rights to com-
mercialize inventions disclosed by the faculty (unless expressly waived). As the gatekeeper,
the TLOs e¤ectiveness in licensing activity directly a¤ects the monetary returns to the fac-
ulty scientist. Raising the royalty share will have a smaller e¤ect on incentives if the faculty
scientist anticipates that the TLO will be ine¤ective at commercializing her inventions. We
provide new survey evidence which shows that TLOs in private universities are more likely to
use performance-based pay, are less constrained in their freedom of operation by state laws and
regulations, and are more focused on generating license income rather than socialobjectives
such as promoting local and regional development. The survey evidence is consistent with
our ndings that private university TLOs are more e¤ective at generating license income, on
average, and that royalty incentives have a larger impact in private universities.
We emphasize that this paper is not a normative analysis of university technology li-
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censing activity. Greater commercialization has both benets and costs. We show that private
benets to universities, in the form of license income, appear to be strongly a¤ected by royalty
incentives. The potential costs of commercialisation include the reallocation of scientistse¤ort
from basic to more applied research and less open science in universities. While the public
debate has focused heavily on such costs, economic research in this area is only just beginning.3
We do not address these costs in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents a
simple theoretical model of academic research that establishes a relationship between royalty
incentives and scientistsresearch e¤ort. In Section 4 we present the empirical specication and
address the empirical issues that arise in testing the main theoretical implications. Section 5
presents the empirical results and their implications, as well as a variety of robustness checks.
Brief concluding remarks follow.
2 Data
The data assembled for this project came from three main sources: 1) the Annual Licensing
Surveys for the years 1991-1999 published by the Association of University Technology Man-
agers (AUTM), 2) the 1993 National Survey of Graduate Faculty conducted by the National
Research Council (NRC), and 3) royalty sharing arrangements downloaded from technology
licensing o¢ ceswebsites. Details of the variables and the sample selection are provided in
Appendix 1.
The AUTM surveys provide information on licensing income, number of licenses, number
of inventions reported to the TLO (invention disclosures), characteristics of the technology
licensing o¢ ce (TLO), and R&D funding from external sources in universities.
To control for di¤erences across universities in faculty size (in the hard sciences) and
scholarly quality, we use data from the 1993 NRC Survey. For each university we have infor-
mation on faculty size and on three measures of quality for doctoral programs in twenty-three
di¤erent elds of science, which we aggregate to the university level using faculty size weights.
3For an interesting theoretical analysis of the role for universities and private rms in basic and applied
research, see Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein (2005). The available empirical studies on university patenting,
applied research and open science give mixed results (Henderson, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 1998; Agrawal and
Henderson, 2002; Murray and Stern, 2004).
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The primary quality measure we use is the number of citations per faculty during the period
1988-92.4
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for private and public universities separately. The
universities in our sample account for 68.1 percent of total license income in 1999, as reported
by AUTM. These universities generate an average of $3.6 million of license income per year.
Not surprisingly, this income is unevenly distributed across universities: the median license
income is just $868,000 for private and $539,000 for public universities, but the top 10 percent
of private universities earn over $11.5 million per year ($5.8 million for public). Normalizing
by the number of active licenses (row 2) does not eliminate this variation. The median revenue
per license is $28,000 for private and $17,000 for public universities, while the top 10 percent
of universities have mean license income above $99,000 and $65,000, respectively. In short, the
distribution of license income is very skewed: only a few universities produce very valuable
inventions.
Citations per faculty reect both the quantity and quality of publications and exhibits
the highest dispersion across universities. The three measures of quality are highly correlated
(with correlations above 0.76). Technology licensing o¢ ces at most universities are quite small,
with a mean of about three full-time professionals. The average age of TLOs in 1999 was
16, reecting the stimulus to commercialize university inventions given by the 1980 Bayh-Dole
Act. Except for the quality measures private universities are of higher quality on average 
there are no statistically signicant di¤erences among the two groups in the other university
characteristics.
Our third source of data was information on the distribution of licensing income between
faculty scientists and the university, i.e., on the arrangements for sharing the royalties generated
by the licensed inventions. This information was downloaded from the websites of individual
technology licensing o¢ ces during the summer of 2001 and it constitutes the novel aspect of
our data.
4We also experimented with two alternative university quality measures, the number of publications per
faculty and a scholarly quality rating score between zero (not su¢ cient for doctoral education) and ve
(distinguished) to check the robustness of the results. Both of these other two measures are highly correlated
with the citations measure we use, and the econometric results using the other measures are similar to those we
report in Section 5.
5
The intellectual property policies of the universities usually state that a percentage of
the net income received by the university from licensing an invention is retained by the inventor
and the rest is allocated to the inventors lab, department, college and to the university. The
criterion we used for identifying the inventor share is that the inventor must gain either cash
ow rights or direct control rights over the income. Thus, when the universitys intellectual
property policy states that the share accruing to the lab was under the control of the inventor,
we added it to the inventors share, but otherwise we did not. We call this the inventors
royalty share. In Section 5, we examine whether cash payments to the inventor and to her
research lab have di¤erent incentive e¤ects. This allows us to say something about the relative
importance of monetary and intrinsic (research-oriented) motivations.
The observed royalty shares were those in e¤ect (and posted on the web) in 2001. Because
we study the impact of royalty shares on licensing outcomes during the period 1991-99, we
wanted to identify any changes that occurred during these years. We sent an e-mail inquiry
to the directors of the TLOs in the sample, and found that 70 percent of the universities did
not change their royalty distribution during the sample period. In fact, in many cases the
arrangements were set in the early 1980s and never changed. In the universities where royalty
shares changed, and where the pre- and post-change levels were available, we assigned the
reported values of the royalty shares to the relevant years.5
In 58 universities the inventor royalty share is a xed percentage of the license income
generated by an invention (hereafter, linear royalty schedules). Interestingly, in the other 44
universities these royalty shares vary with the level of license income generated by an invention
(non-linear royalty schedules). Because the income intervals di¤er across universities, we di-
vided the license income into seven intervals based on the most frequently observed structure
(in US$): 0-10,000, 10,000-50,000, 50,000-100,000, 100,000-300,000, 300,000-0.5 million, 0.5-1.0
million, and over 1 million.6 For these universities we compute an expected royalty share by
5 In total, 53 universities responded to this query. Of the sixteen that reported a change in royalty shares
during 1991-99, only eleven reported the pre- and post-change royalty sharing agreements. In these cases, we
included the new royalty shares for the appropriate years. In the remaining ve universities, we used the shares
reported in 2001.
6 In the many cases where our selected interval did not correspond to the interval chosen by the university, we
recomputed royalty shares with the correct weights. For example, if a university reports a 50 percent share for
income less than 5,000 and 40 percent share for income above 5,000, this would appear as an 45 percent share
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weighting the average share in each income interval by the probability of observing license
income in that interval. These probabilities were estimated non-parametrically from the dis-
tribution of license revenue per invention over all years in the AUTM sample. Let vit denote
license income per invention disclosure in university i in year t. We rst estimated the density
f(vit) by kernel methods at these values. We then computed an average royalty share for each
value of v;
_
s(v); using the royalty schedule for each university, taking into account the varying
marginal royalty rates.7 The expected royalty share is then s  v
_
s(v) bf(v):8 ;9
Table 2 summarizes the main features of the royalty share data. The average inventor
share is 39 and 42 percent for private and public universities using linear royalty schedules,
but there is substantial cross-sectional variation within each group. Average royalty shares in
the universities with non-linear schedules is 51 percent, higher than for the linear schedules,
and displaying even larger cross-sectional variation. The striking variation in inventor royalty
in the rst interval (0-10,000) and an 40 percent share in all the remaining intervals.
7For example, with three marginal rates the average share is
s(v) =
s1v
v
I(0  v  v1) + s1v1 + s2(v   v1)
v
I(v1 < v  v2) + s1v1 + s2v2 + s3(v   v2)I(v > v2)
v
where I() is an indicator function.
8The estimated density function of license income per invention disclosed (not shown) exhibits extreme
dispersion and skewness. Such skewness is typical of distributions of the returns to innovation (e.g., Schankerman,
1998). In our case, nearly all of the weight is on the rst two income intervals 50.2 percent in the 0-$10,000
bracket and 46.1 in the $10,000-$50,000 bracket. Thus it would be highly inappropriate to use a simple average
of sharing rates in a nonlinear schedule. In fact, for practical purposes a good approximation is simply to average
the rst two sharing rates.
Two other points should be noted. First, we also used yearly license income divided by the cumulative number
of active licenses as a measure of v and obtained essentially the same estimates of s. The two estimates di¤er by
at most 1.7 percentage points, and the average di¤erence is 0.7 percentage points. We normalized by disclosures
because data on cumulative licenses is available only since 1995 resulting in a smaller number of observations.
Second, one might want to estimate separate density functions for sub-categories of the pooled data, e.g., for
di¤erent technology elds or universities of di¤erent quality levels. Since we do not have license revenue broken
down by technology area, we cannot treat areas separately. However, we did estimate di¤erent kernel density
functions for the lower, middle two, and upper quartiles of the quality distribution (using citations per faculty).
The di¤erences in the estimated kernel weights were negligible.
9The density estimates used to compute the expected royalty share are based on the observed distribution of
license income per invention disclosed (v). However, if license income responds to royalty shares (as suggested
by the theoretical model in Section 3) then the observed bf(v) depends on the royalty sharing schedule. This is
an issue only for the universities with nonlinear schedules. To account for this circularity, we regressed license
income per disclosure on s (and other controls) and used the residuals to recompute the kernel density estimates
and the expected royalty share. We found that the average di¤erence in the computed expected royalty shares
was only 1.3 percentage points, or about 2.5 percent of the mean royalty share (51 percent). Because this is a
small di¤erence and also because the nal estimates (in Table 5) were essentially invariant to the two ways in
which s was computed, we decided to use the simpler, observed distribution of license income per disclosure in
our computation of the expected royalty share.
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shares is shown in Figure 1, where the histogram and a nonparametric estimate of the density
of the expected royalty share are displayed for private and public universities separately. We
exploit this cross-sectional variation to identify the e¤ect of monetary incentives on license
revenue from invention.
Another striking feature of Table 2 is that inventor royalty shares are either constant or
decline in the level of license income per invention  royalty retention is regressive (i.e., the
university taxon inventors is progressive). On average, they start at 53 percent in the lowest
interval and decline to 30 percent for inventions generating over $1 million. This feature holds
in every quartile of the cross-sectional distribution and, in fact, it holds for every university in
our sample with non-linear royalty schedules.10
In order to get some understanding of the determinants of the variation in royalty shares
across universities, we split the sample into four quartiles dened by a variety of university
characteristics and computed the mean royalty share in each quartile. Table 3 summarises the
results, separately, for private and public universities. Royalty shares are not systematically
related to faculty size, the number of citations per faculty (our measure of academic quality),
the size of the TLO (measured by the number of TLO professionals per faculty), the age of the
TLO, or the shares of the faculty in biomedical sciences and engineering. As the last row in
the table shows, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean royalty rate is the same across
the four quartiles of the distribution for each characteristic. Apparently there is no signicant
correlation between royalty shares and these university characteristics, taken individually.
These simple bivariate comparisons also hold in a regression context. In a regression of
the royalty share on three binary indicators for each of the quartiles of the six characteristics
(not reported for brevity), we nd that these characteristics are not jointly signicant (the
p-values for signicance of the regression are 0.59 and 0.17 for private and public universities,
10Regressive royalty sharing (i.e. progressive taxation of inventors) give inventors an incentive to focus on
many low value inventions rather than on big hits. Optimal taxation theory can generate progressive tax
schedules when there is uncertainty to e¤ort when high income outcomes are largely due to luck rather than
e¤ort together with risk aversion of the agents. In this case such taxes are essentially an insurance mechanism.
This argument is relevant here if the scientist knows little about the quality of di¤erent research projects ex
ante. In such cases, high payo¤ projects are basically due to good luck, and regressive royalty sharing may then
be preferred by the inventor. But if the inventor has some ability to distinguish between low and high quality
projects in making e¤ort decisions, then optimal incentives are more likely to involve progressive royalty sharing
in order to compensate for the higher marginal cost of producing higher-valued inventions. Of course, fairness
and other considerations may a¤ect how universities set royalty sharing.
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respectively). We also cannot reject the hypothesis that each of the characteristics is individ-
ually insignicant. In addition, we ran a probit regression on the choice between linear and
nonlinear royalty sharing against the same six characteristics. Again we do not reject the null
that these characteristics are jointly insignicant (p-values are 0.30 and 0.94 for private and
public universities, respectively). Finally, it is worth noting that the top quality and leading
licensing performers are not the universities that o¤er the highest royalty shares. For example,
the royalty shares are 33 percent for Stanford and MIT, 34 percent for Harvard, and 49 percent
for Columbia and the University of California System. The overall mean royalty share in the
sample is 45 percent.
To summarise, the two salient features of observed royalty sharing arrangements are their
variability across universities and their regressiveness in the level of license income. Moreover,
the evidence suggests that neither the form of the royalty sharing arrangement (linear versus
nonlinear) nor the level of inventor royalty shares are signicantly related to observed university
characteristics. While it is important to study the determinants of royalty sharing arrange-
ments in more detail, this would require information on the actual decision-making process at
universities, which is beyond the scope of the present paper. As discussed in the next section,
however, royalty shares may still be correlated with unobserved factors at the university level
that also a¤ect license income. We will address this potential endogeneity problem by using
pre-sample information on university patenting.
3 Model
A scientist makes three types of research e¤ort: basic research (e), applied research devoted
to starting new projects (z); and applied research to improve the quality of each project (q):
Basic research generates scientic publications. The applied research e¤orts generate two types
of outputs, projects with commercial value and scientic publications. This characterisation is
based on the argument that scientic research is often dual-purpose, frequently referred to in
the literature as Pasteurs Quadrant(e.g., Stokes, 1997).11
The production setup is as follows. First, the number of scientic publications is given
11 In this specication, we are essentially dening purely basic research as any research that generates only
publications.
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by an increasing, concave production function p(e; z; q). The assumption that this function
is non-decreasing in z and q does not rule out a tradeo¤ between basic and applied research.
The tradeo¤ enters here through the allocation of e¤ort (and associated e¤ort costs). Second,
the number of new applied research projects is n = n(z) where n(z) is increasing and concave.
Each invention has the same initial quality normalised at unity. By investing e¤ort q into a
project, the inventor generates an invention of potential commercial value v(q) =  (q)" where
 (q) > 1 is increasing and concave and " is a stochastic shock independent of q; with unit
mean value and distribution function G: The shock " is observed after the scientist chooses
e¤ort levels. With no ex-ante di¤erences among the n inventions, the scientist sets the same
level q for each.12
E¤ort costs are given by the convex function C(e; z; q): This should be interpreted as a
reduced-form representation of a more complete model in which these e¤ort costs reect the
universitys valuation of di¤erent types of research. The university controls these shadow prices
by setting promotion criteria and other rewards, including royalty shares.
The invention earns revenue v if it is licensed (zero otherwise), where 0 <   1 reects
the e¤ectiveness of the TLO. While v is the inventions maximum potential commercial value,
actual license income depends on how good the TLO is at identifying potential licensees and
negotiating agreements.13 These capabilities are likely to depend on institutional characteris-
tics, such as whether the university is public or private (for more discussion, see Section 4.1).
The TLO licenses an invention if expected income covers the xed cost of licensing, v. The
selection rule v > v implies that a proportion 1 G

v
 (q)

of inventions is licensed.14
12An equivalent formulation is to allow the initial value of the idea to be random and unknown to the researcher
when the decision on e¤ort q is made. We need some form of uncertainty in the model because otherwise the
scientist would either set q = 0 or set q at a level to ensure that any developed idea would pass the TLO selection
rule (see below in the text). But this is not consistent with the data: the ratio of licenses executed to invention
disclosures in a given year is about 30 percent, on average.
13As others have emphasised, apart from her role in doing the research that generates an invention, the
university scientist also plays an important role in the commercialisation process, identifying potential licensees
and transferring tacit knowledge. The royalty incentive can a¤ect licensing revenue through both channels in
practice, though we emphasise the invention channel in the model. For discussion of the optimal design of
contracts for university technology transfer that recognises the scientists post-invention role, see Jensen and
Thursby (2001) and Macho-Stadler, Castrillo and Veugelers (forthcoming), and Agrawal (2006).
14This specication of the licensing decision is consistent with new survey data we gathered from TLOs,
described briey in Section 4.1.
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Expected license revenue per faculty is
r(z; q) = n(z) (q)
Z 1
v
 (q)
"dG(") (1)
Note that rz > 0; rq > 0, rzq > 0; rz > 0 and rq > 0.15 Quality e¤ortq has two e¤ects: it
raises the expected value of the invention, which also increases the probability the TLO will
license it.
The scientist derives utility from license income and publications, V (e; z; q) = V (sr(z; q); p(e; z; q))
where V is increasing in both arguments and concave. We also assume that the utility function
is separable in license income and publications, V12 = 0: The scientists problem is
max
e;z;q
V (sr(z; q); p(e; z; q))  C(e; z; q)
The rst order conditions are
e : V2pe   Ce = 0
z : sV1rz + V2pz   Cz = 0
q : sV1rq + V2pq   Cq = 0
where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the di¤erent arguments. The dual
purpose role of applied research is reected in the rst order conditions for z and q: In Appendix
2 we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Higher inventor royalty rates and more e¤ective technology licensing o¢ ces
raise basic research and both the quantity and quality dimensions of applied research  @e@s 
15 It should be noted that for rq > 0, we need the additional (su¢ cient) assumption that the density function
g(") is declining in " at v
 (q)
where q is the solution to the maximization problem. The expression is
rq = n(z) 
0(q)
 Z 1
v
 (q)
"g(")d" 

v
 (q)
3
g0

v
 (q)
!
(2)
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0; @e@  0; @z@s  0; @z@  0; @q@s  0 and @q@  0 provided the following su¢ cient conditions hold:
V1 + s
2V11r  0
V1 + sV11r  0
V22pepz + V2pez   Cez  0
V22pepq + V2peq   Ceq  0
V22pzpq + V2pzq   Czq  0
The rst two conditions in the Proposition are satised if diminishing returns to income
in the utility function are not too strong. The last three conditions require that there be
net complementaritybetween the basic and applied research e¤orts, taking into account both
the impact in the publications function and the e¤ort cost function. That is, the marginal
utility of each, net of e¤ort cost, must be a non-decreasing function of the others. This is
consistent with the recent empirical ndings, based on panel data for university scientists, that
publications and patenting appear to be complements rather than substitutes (e.g., Azoulay,
Ding and Stuart, 2006).
One interesting special case is where there is no interaction between basic and applied
research e¤orts, i.e., V22pepz+V2pez Cez = 0 and V22pepq+V2peq Ceq = 0: This arises when
applied research is not dual-purpose i.e., (z; q) do not generate publications and where the
marginal e¤ort costs of applied and basic research are independent. Then we get @e@s = 0 and
@e
@ = 0; but even in that case we still get
@z
@s  0; @z@  0; @q@s  0 and @q@  0:
The key empirical implication of this simple model is that, under the stated conditions,
optimal (z; q) are increasing in the inventor royalty share, s; and TLO e¤ectiveness, : This
implies that license revenue per faculty, r(z(s; ); q(s; ); should increase in (s; ): This is the
implication we set out to test with data on university-level revenues, royalty rates, and proxies
for : Note that the model implies that both the number of projects, n (innovations), and the
average quality of projects, v, should increase in (s; ):16
16The model also predicts a positive relationship between publications and royalty shares, under specic
conditions, but this implication is not explored in this paper.
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4 Empirical Specication
We assume that observed university licence revenue equals its expected value Fr(s; ) up to a
multiplicative measurement error, eu; where F is faculty size;
R(s; ) = Fr(z(s; ); q(s; ))eu
where u is assumed to be stochastically independent of s and  with E(eu) = 1:
Taking logs on both sides and linearizing we get
logR = logF + s+  + terms involving G and v + u
where u is independent of the main regressors s and :
Since  in not observed, we use the size and experience (age) of the TLO as proxies in
the empirical work. In addition to (log) faculty size, the regression equation includes variables
that capture di¤erences across universities in G and v : specically, the number of citations per
faculty (academic quality), R&D funding, and the shares of faculty in each of six elds in the
hard sciences to measure research orientation (see Appendix 1). Denoting all these proxies by
the vector x; the basic model is
logR = s+ x + u (3)
The parameter  represents the incentive e¤ect of royalty shares on (unobserved) research e¤ort
levels, including the e¤ects of the TLO through their selection of inventions to commercialize,
as equation (1) makes clear.
Despite our controls, there is likely to be unobserved heterogeneity in research produc-
tivity or commercial orientation of faculty. If this heterogeneity is correlated with s and  (or
its proxies), a potential endogeneity problem arises. There are two main ways in which such
correlation might arise: reverse causality and omitted variables (or sorting). The rst is a
rent-seekingargument about how royalty shares are set. Researchers with more commercial
orientation or more valuable inventions may have been able to exploit their bargaining position
to lobby their universities for more favorable royalty rates. In this case, estimating (3) by
ordinary least squares would give an upward biased estimate of .
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Berkowitz and Feldman (2005) show that there are di¤erences in institutional culture
and historical experience in technology transfer activity across universities and that research
culture has a strong e¤ect on the propensity to commercialize university inventions. Such
culture is likely to also inuence royalty policy. Thus, a second way that endogeneity can
arise is that universities with a more commercial orientation may attempt to attract more
applied (innovation-oriented) faculty by o¤ering a higher inventor royalty share or providing a
more e¤ective TLO (higher ). If successful, this sorting policywill also generate a positive
correlation between (s; ) and unobserved commercial or entrepreneurial quality: universities
with higher (s; ) will have more productive (innovation-oriented) faculty. This is essentially an
omitted variable problem; we do have measures of academic quality but not of entrepreneurial
quality or orientation and this will also bias upward the estimated :17
There is, however, a subtle di¤erence between the two cases. In the sorting example, the
estimated  would be an upward biased estimate of the pure e¤ort component of the royalty
incentive e¤ect, but it would remain a consistent estimate of the overall incentive e¤ect, which
includes both the e¤ort and sorting components. By contrast, in the reverse causality example
we may nd an incentive e¤ect when, in fact, there is none. In the empirical section we address
the potential problem of reverse causality by controlling for the pre-sample patenting activity
of the university.
Sorting is essentially an issue of how to interpret the estimated incentive e¤ect. Nonethe-
less, it is important to try to distinguish between the e¤ort and sorting components because
they have very di¤erent policy implications. The e¤ort model implies that strengthening roy-
alty incentives would increase aggregate inventive output (i.e., social gains as well as private
ones), whereas a pure sorting model would imply that this would only redistribute inventive
output across universities.
It is di¢ cult to pin down the e¤ects of these two mechanisms in the absence of data on
17Recall, however, that we include the shares of faculty by eld in order to capture research orientation, which
is likely to be correlated with commercial orientation. More generally, we recognise that some of the other
controls may also be endogeneous, such as the size of the TLO and the level of R&D funding. This should be
kept in mind in interpreting the estimated coe¢ cients on these variables. However, we are particularly interested
in the di¤erence between the estimates for private and public universities (especially for TLO size), and there is
no reason to believe that the direction of bias is di¤erent for the two types of universities.
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individual inventors.18 While the university-level data seriously limit what we can say about
sorting, we can modify the empirical specication of the model to incorporate sorting e¤ects.
If sorting occurs, the ability of the university to attract entrepreneurial faculty depends both
on its own royalty share and on the shares o¤ered by the set of universities with which it
competes. Let sic denotes the mean royalty share in the set of universities competing with
university i: The impact of sorting on log license revenue of university i is assumed to take the
form (si; sic) where
@
@si
 0 and @@sic  0: We use a linear form (si; sic) = 1si + 2sic with
1  0 and 2  0: Using this, we can write the model incorporating both the e¤ort and sorting
mechanisms as follows
logRi = ( + 1) si + 2sic + x + u (4)
As before,  captures the pure e¤ort e¤ect of royalty shares, while 1 and 2 capture the
sorting e¤ect. We emphasize that the total incentive e¤ect of university i0s royalty share is
given by the sum  + 1: In this linear formulation, 1 is not identied if there is also sorting.
We can test the null hypothesis that there is no sorting, H0 : 2 = 0: If this is rejected, then
the coe¢ cient on si captures both the e¤ort and sorting e¤ects of royalty shares.
To implement this approach, we need to measure sic: To do this, we assume that faculty
typically move among universities at similar quality levels.19 We rank all universities (both
private and public) according to the number of citations per faculty, and then dene the set
of competing universities as those within a specied window size around university i in this
ranking. Note that this procedure allows private and public universities to compete with each
other in the relevant quality window. For example, a window of size one includes the nearest
university above and below university i, and thus means that the scientist chooses among three
universities (including his current location) when deciding whether to move.
18Lazear (2000) emphasises the di¤erent e¤ects of performance based pay on e¤ort and sorting in his study
of the productivity gains of moving from hourly to piece-rate pay in a large auto glass company. He found that
about half of the gains were due to increases in e¤ort and the other half to sorting or possibly other factors.
19 In the survey of TLO directors discussed in Section 4.1, we asked whether staying in line with competing
universitieswas an important consideration in setting royalty sharing rates and, if so, how they would dene
that group. Academic quality was the most frequently listed criterion.
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4.1 Gatekeeper E¤ect: Explaining Public-Private University Di¤erences
All universities in our sample retain control rights over inventions so that the TLO e¤ectively
has exclusive rights (unless expressly waived) to commercialize the inventions. Because the TLO
is the gatekeeper, its e¤ectiveness at nding licensees and negotiating agreements directly
a¤ects the monetary returns to the faculty scientist. As a consequence, raising the royalty
share will have a smaller incentive e¤ect if faculty scientists anticipate that the TLO will be
ine¤ective at commercializing their inventions. We call this interaction between the incentive
e¤ect and the e¤ectiveness of the TLO the gatekeeper e¤ect. This interaction arises because the
inventors expected license income, sr(; s); depends directly on the product s; as is clear from
(1). Therefore, the marginal incentive e¤ect of royalty sharing is rising in the TLO e¤ectiveness
parameter, . In the extreme case where  = 0; the share apportioned to faculty will not matter
at all.20
There are good reasons to believe that private universities may be more e¤ective at
generating license income than public ones, at least on average. University ownership may a¤ect
the constraints under which the TLO operates in selecting licensees and striking agreements.
Public and private universities may also have di¤erent objectives  in particular, the former
may be more concerned with local development than with license income maximization. And
nally, university ownership may a¤ect the ability or willingness of TLOs to adopt high-
powered incentives for their sta¤. Unfortunately, there is almost no available information on
the objectives, constraints and incentives within TLOs. For this purpose we developed a new
survey questionnaire for TLO directors in public and private universities.21
20Using (1) we get
@R
@s
= F

H(s; )fn(s; ) 0 @q
@s
+  (s; )n0
@z
@s
g+  (s; )n(s; )@H
@s

where H(s; )  R1 v
 (q(s;))
"dG("): The gatekeeper e¤ect operates if @
2R
@@s
> 0: If the TLO licenses all inventions
(H(s; ) = 1); this property holds as long as diminishing returns in n(z) and  (q) are not too strong. The
intuition is as follows: a rise in  increases the marginal payo¤s to (z; q); raising their optimal levels. This direct
e¤ect increases the marginal payo¤ to s: But at the new, higher levels of (z; q); the marginal returns to e¤ort
are lower due to diminishing returns, which reduces the marginal payo¤ to s. In order to get @
2R
@@s
> 0; these
diminishing returns must not dominate the direct e¤ect. If invention quality a¤ects the probability of being
licensed (H(s; ) < 1), we also require that the density function g(") not increase too much in ":
21We sent the questionnaire to TLO directors in 198 public and private universities. They included both those
used in the regression analysis an others. After considerable e¤ort, we managed to get 101 responses, of which 57
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Table 4 summarizes key results from the survey. First, faculty in both public and pri-
vate universities are well-aware of monetary incentives from commercializing their inventions.
Second, in the vast majority of cases in both public and private universities, faculty reward
structures (salaries and promotion) do not give any signicant weight to technology transfer
outputs. Third, there are sharp di¤erences between universities in the use of performance-based
pay for TLO sta¤, and in the constraints and objectives of the TLOs. Private universities are
signicantly more likely to use performance-based pay (row 3), and are much less constrained
by either formal government regulations or informal government pressure in each of the six
categories of constraints we examine.22 Interestingly, public and private universities share the
objectives of increasing the number of licenses and license income, but public universities are
much more likely to rank promoting local or regional economic developmentas an important
objective.
These survey ndings strongly suggest that the parameter  is larger in private univer-
sities than in public ones, at least on average.23 This nding has three testable predictions in
the regression model: (1) because of the gatekeeper e¤ect, the coe¢ cient on the royalty share
(the incentive e¤ect) should be larger for private universities than for public ones, and (2) the
coe¢ cient on TLO size should be larger for private universities. Moreover, larger TLOs (rel-
ative to faculty size) should be more e¤ective at commercialising university inventions. Thus
a third implication is that, both for private and public universities, the incentive e¤ect should
be increasing in TLO size.
were in the regression sample. The results of this survey are analysed more fully in Belenzon and Schankerman
(2006).
22The survey question is: Does the state government impose any signicant constraints that limit the e¤ec-
tiveness of [your] TLO activity...either explicit forms - such as statutes, regulations, covenants of the university
charter - or implicit forms such as pressure from political representatives or agencies.
23 In a follow-up paper, Belenzon and Schankerman (2006) estimate the quantitative impacts of performance-
based pay, local development objectives and government constraints on various dimensions of university tech-
nology transfer, including the number of licenses, revenue and start-ups.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Nonparametric Evidence
We begin by abstracting from other determinants of license income and non-parametrically
estimate the expectation of license income per faculty conditional on royalty shares, E
 
R
F js

;
using Fans (1992) locally weighted regression smoother. Figure 2 plots estimates for the public
and private universities separately.
E
 
R
F js

is clearly increasing in s and somewhat non-linear: although license income is not
very responsive to economic incentives at the low range of the royalty shares, this is strikingly
reversed at shares above 40 percent. Also notice that the response to incentives is larger for
privately owned universities as compared to public ones. To verify these nonparametric results
and to quantify the relationships between license income and royalty incentives controlling for
other university characteristics, we turn to regression analysis.
5.2 Baseline Econometric Evidence
The data form an unbalanced panel of 102 universities for the period 1991-1999. However, panel
data estimation methods that allow for a correlation between the royalty share and unobserved,
time-invariant determinants of license revenues such as xed e¤ects or rst di¤erences are
of limited use here because the royalty share does not vary over time in 90 percent of the
observations. The incentive e¤ect is primarily identied from the cross-sectional variation,
while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by using pre-sample information on patenting by
universities. We allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within universities
(standard errors are clustered at the university level).
We allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within universities (stan-
dard errors are clustered at the university level) and attempt to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity by using pre-sample information on patenting by universities.
We rst compare alternative specications of the model, focusing on the estimated royalty
incentive e¤ect. Once we arrive at the baseline specication, we discuss the full set of
coe¢ cients in more detail.
Table 5 presents estimates for equation (4) for private and public universities separately.
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We strongly reject pooling of these two sub-samples (the test on the full set of 23 coe¢ cients
yields p-value < 0.001; this holds for other specications as well). Columns (1) and (5) treat
royalty shares as exogenous and ignore the (sorting) e¤ect of competing universities (we set
2 = 0): The OLS estimates indicate large and statistically signicant incentive e¤ects in
both private and public universities. The point estimate of the incentive e¤ect, however, is
more than twice as large in private universities, and this di¤erence will hold for all alternative
specications. We will test below whether this di¤erence in statistically signicant in the
baseline regression, where we incorporate both sorting and the pre-sample patent control for
unobserved heterogeneity.
In columns (2) and (6) we add the average shares of competing universities to the
regressions. This specication incorporates both the e¤ort and sorting mechanisms into the
model, as discussed in Section 4. We rank universities according to citations per faculty and
dene the set of competing universities as those closest to (above and below) university i in this
ranking. In dening the competing universities, we include both public and private universities,
although we estimate the model separately for the two types. The results reported in the table
are based on a window of size one, i.e. using a total of two competing universities. (Table 7
presents robustness results for windows of up to size four). It is very striking that the estimate
of 2 is negative for both private and public universities and, in the former case, quite large
relative to the estimate of the own royalty e¤ect. In private universities, we can reject the
hypothesis that there is no sorting (2 = 0). The estimated incentive e¤ect - the coe¢ cient of
s - captures both the e¤ort and sorting e¤ects of the own royalty share, ( + 1): But it is
worth noting that this estimated incentive e¤ect is not much changed by the inclusion of sc:
For public universities, we nd no evidence of sorting.24
Finally, using the specication with both e¤ort and sorting, we attempt to control for
correlation between royalty shares and unobserved heterogeneity. We adopt the approach devel-
24We cannot test the hypothesis that there is no e¤ort e¤ect ( = 0) without additional assumptions. In
particular, if we make the assumption that (si; sic) is homogeneous of degree zero, then the hypothesis that
there is no e¤ort e¤ect (pure sorting) implies that the coe¢ cients on si and sic should sum to zero. Because of
the large standard we cannot formally reject the hypothesis +1+2 = 0 under the maintained hypothesis that
1 =  2: However, given the associated standard error, we would also not reject the hypothesis that the e¤ort
e¤ect equals the sorting e¤ect,  = 1 and  2 = 1: In any case, there is no compelling theoretical basis for the
assumption that the own incentive e¤ect and the competing e¤ect are equally important for license revenues.
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oped by Blundell, Gri¢ th and van Reenen (1999). They show that under the assumption that
the unobserved xed e¤ect can be expressed as a linear function of the observable characteris-
tics, the pre-sample mean of the dependent variable is a su¢ cient statistic for the unobserved
xed e¤ect. Thus one can use this pre-sample mean as an additional regressor to control for
such heterogeneity. In our context, this would involve using the pre-sample mean of license rev-
enues to control for unobserved university e¤ects: We do not have pre-sample information on
license revenues, but we can use pre-sample information on patenting by the university (both
patent counts and citations).25 In Appendix 3 we show that pre-sample patent information
can be used instead of pre-sample license revenues, provided we assume that patenting is also a
linear function of the same unobserved heterogeneity that a¤ects license revenues, which seems
very reasonable (see Appendix 3 for technical details).
The results are presented in columns (3) and (7) in Table 5, and constitute our baseline
specicationof the model. The estimated coe¢ cients of the pre-sample controls are positive
and highly signicant. As expected, adding the log of the mean number of citations to patents
applied for between 1975 and 1990 to the regression reduces the estimated e¤ects of royalty
shares  by about 20 percent. With the pre-sample control, the estimated incentive e¤ect
remains statistically signicant for private universities, but not for public ones. The fact that
the estimated incentive e¤ect falls when we include the pre-sample control indicates that there
is some endogeneity at work. Of course, one can never entirely rule out the possibility that
some unobserved, correlated heterogeneity remains, but that available data does not allow us
to do more to address this issue.26
These results suggest that royalty shares have a positive incentive e¤ect on license revenue
for private, and possibly also for public, universities. The estimated e¤ect is strongly signicant
and large in private universities, but smaller and less precisely estimated in public universities.
25We actually use the log of one plus the number of patent counts or citations so as not to discard universities
with zero citations. The within-sample (1991-99) cross sectional correlation between patent counts (citations)
and license revenue is very high, ranging between 0.65 and 0.79 for private universities and between 0.60 and
0.72 for public universities.
26Two points should be noted. First, we tried to instrument the royalty share with data on income tax rates
in the state where the university is located, the percentage of the university faculty in hard sciences, and the
size of the university endowment. These instruments proved to be too weak to produce sensible results. Second,
the lack of correlation between royalty shares and our observed university characteristics means that we cannot
use nonparametric matching methods (e.g., propensity scores) to estimate the royalty incentive e¤ect.
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The point estimate implies that a one percentage point increase in royalty share would increase
license income by 4.5 percent in private institutions. This large incentive e¤ect is one of the
main empirical ndings of this paper. It conrms the basic economic intuition that high-
powered monetary incentives do matter for university research activity. In view of all the
other determinants for which we control, it is encouraging that we can still nd an empirical
relationship between license income and royalty shares.
Furthermore, it appears that the incentive e¤ect is larger in private institutions than
in public universities. While it is di¢ cult to be condent about whether these di¤erences are
statistically signicant (as we discuss below, it depends on how general we make the specication
for serial correlation), the results are consistent with the non-parametric evidence in suggesting
that scientists in private universities exhibit a stronger response to royalty incentives than those
in public universities. To our knowledge, this is the rst empirical evidence on the impact of
royalty incentives, and of how university ownership may a¤ect faculty responsiveness to such
incentives.
In order to test formally the null hypothesis that the incentive e¤ects are the same in
private and public universities, we pool the regressions (using the baseline model with sorting
and the pre-sample control) and allow all coe¢ cients to di¤er between private and public
institutions. We then test the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on the royalty share are the
same. When we use standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticty and serial
correlation (clustered at the university level), we cannot formally reject the null hypothesis (the
t statistic on the di¤erence is 1.04). When we use a somewhat less demanding specication
of serial correlation an AR(1) specication the t-statistic is 1.47. If we adjust for arbitrary
heteroskedasticity but do not allow for within-university serial correlation (i.e., using White
standard errors), we strongly reject the equality of the incentive e¤ects (t statistic is 2.47). In
summary, we get a large di¤erence between the point estimates of the incentive e¤ect in private
and public universities and, while this di¤erence is robust across specications of the model,
its statistical signicance depends heavily on the error assumptions.
If we constrain the royalty share coe¢ cient to be the same for private and public univer-
sities, but allow all other coe¢ cients to di¤er in the baseline specication, we get an estimated
incentive e¤ect of 2.40 with a (clustered) standard error of 1.26. The corresponding estimate
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for the sorting coe¢ cient is -1.60 with a standard error of 1.02. Thus, even if one takes the
position that the incentive e¤ect is not di¤erent in private and public universities, we still nd
a positive and signicant royalty incentive e¤ect overall, and some evidence for sorting.
The other striking nding in Table 5 concerns the productivity of the TLO. The estimated
elasticity of TLO size on license income is positive and signicant in private universities a
10 percent increase in the number of TLO professionals (equivalent to one-third of a full time
employee, at the sample mean) raises license income in private universities by 5.5 percent.27
However, we nd essentially no e¤ect of TLO size on license income for public universities. It
is important to recognise that these are average e¤ects and do not imply that TLO size has
no e¤ect in any public university or, conversely, that the TLO is equally e¤ective in all private
ones. To understand the variations across universities and to assess how much, and why, these
are tied to university ownership status is an important topic for future research.
We can use the estimated elasticity of TLO size for private universities to compute an
implied marginal product and see how it compares to salaries in the TLO.28 We nd that the
marginal product (evaluated at sample medians) is about three times greater than the median
(chief o¢ cers) salary, which suggests that private universities should substantially expand
their size, if they are trying to maximise total license income, R: However, if they are trying
to maximise license income that accrues to the university (i.e., excluding the inventor share),
(1  s)R; the corresponding marginal product we estimate is only about 50 percent above the
median salary. Thus whether private universities are leaving money on the table, and should
expand their TLO activities, depends in part on what they are trying to maximise.29
In addition, the gains from experience are larger and are realized earlier in private uni-
versities. Using the coe¢ cients on TLO age and its square, we nd that, for private univer-
sities, an additional year of experience increases revenues by 10 percent when TLO age is 8
27We use TLO per faculty since this is what is relevant for the scientist as a determinant of : In this case,
the coe¢ cient of faculty size is capturing a pure size e¤ect. The same comment holds for our use of R&D per
faculty in the regression.
28We compute @R
@TLO
which equals the estimated coe¢ cient of log

TLO Size
Faculty

in the baseline regression times
R
TLO Size :
29Evaluated at medians (over universities and years) for private universities, we get @R
@TLO
= $278; 000 and
@(1 s)R
@TLO
= $160; 000: As a rough comparison, the CUPA (2002) Survey of Administrative Personnel reports the
median salary of $110,000 for chief technology transfer o¢ cersin public and private universities.
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and 7 percent at age 16. For public universities, the estimate is only 3.5 percent. Taken to-
gether, these ndings on TLO size and age suggest that private institutions have more e¤ective,
commercially-oriented technology transfer activity, which is consistent with the survey evidence
presented in Section 4.1.
The elasticity of license revenue with respect to faculty size is 0.74 in both private and
public universities (but signicant only in the latter). We cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the size elasticity is unity. The coe¢ cient on the quality measure - citations per faculty -
is positive but, surprisingly, not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The R&D variable includes
funding from industry, government and non-prot sources. It has a signicant e¤ect only in
public universities, with an elasticity of 0.63. The coe¢ cient on the medical dummy is not
signicant.
We use a variable to control for di¤erences in potential demand for licenses by private
rms (density of high-tech activity). If demand is localized, e.g., due to information, universities
in areas with more high-tech activity should license more inventions from a given pool of
inventions and obtain more revenue. We use the 1995 Milken index of high-tech activity for
each universitys location (Friedman and Silberman, 2003). We assign each university to a
quartile in the Milken index distribution, and then include dummy variables for the rst and
fourth quartiles (the reference level is the middle two quartiles).30 High-tech density has a
quantitatively large e¤ect on the generation of license revenues but its e¤ects are very di¤erent
in private and public universities. Private universities appear to be more e¤ective than public
ones at exploiting the potential of being located in high-tech areas. The fact that local demand
conditions matter at all suggests that either search or other transaction costs are lower when
licensing within the local market. Given the global nature of technology markets, this is
somewhat surprising and worthy of further investigation.
Finally, as controls for di¤erences in research orientation, we use the fraction of the faculty
in each of six technology elds (physical sciences is the reference group; results not reported
for brevity). Surprisingly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no technology eld
30 It is worth noting that royalty shares do not vary much with the Milken index of high-tech activity: the
average shares in rst, middle two, and last quartiles are 42, 47 and 43 percent, respectively. This suggests that
royalty shares are not set in response to the value of outside options available locally to university scientists.
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di¤erences (p-value 0.52 and 0.46 in private and public universities, respectively), once we have
controlled for R&D and other characteristics.
The parameter estimates from Table 5 suggest that raising the inventors royalty share
would increase total license income. The point estimates of ( + 1) imply that raising the
inventor royalty share by ten percentage points would increase license income by 45 and 19
percent in private and public institutions, respectively. In fact, raising the inventor royalty share
can actually increase license income retained by the university, (1  s)R: Since d log(1 s)Rds =
(+ 1)  11 s ; there is a critical royalty share s = 1  (+ 1) 1 such that universities below
this threshold can actually increase their retained income by raising the royalty share (the
La¤er e¤ect), while universities above the threshold can do so by reducing the royalty share.
For private universities, s = 0:78; and the La¤er e¤ect holds for most of them. For public
universities, s = 0:48; which holds for about half of these universities.
Why would universities leave money on the table rather than change inventor royalty
shares? Apart from not knowing this potential exists, there are two explanations. First,
universities have multiple objectives and competing faculty interests in setting royalty shares,
including incentives, fairness, and being competitive with other universities (sorting issues).
The second explanation relates to the assumption the university makes about how competing
universities might respond to a change in its own royalty share. The calculation above assumes
that competing universities do not react by changing their royalty shares. But if a university
believes that its competitors will fully match any changes it makes, the La¤er e¤ect is much
less likely to operate. Taking the competitive e¤ect into account, the threshold for the La¤er
e¤ect becomes s = 1  (+1+2) 1: Using the point estimates, we get the implied threshold
of 0.50 and -0.15 for private and public universities, respectively. This implies that no public
universities are leaving any money on the table, though some private ones still appear to be
doing so.31 More generally, this discussion emphasises the importance of developing a more
complete model of university competition and strategic interaction.
As explained in Section 4.1, the gatekeeper e¤ect predicts that the royalty incentive e¤ect
31Of course, even if a university is in the region where the La¤er e¤ect does not hold, a university might want
to raise the royalty share if it attaches weight to the license income for its faculty inventors (e.g., the university
could reduce salaries in return for higher royalty shares).
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should be an increasing function of the e¤ectiveness of the TLO. Relevant determinants of this
e¤ectiveness include the size of the TLO (relative to faculty), the use of performance-based
pay, government constraints and other factors that appear to di¤er between private and public
universities (Table 4). Because of di¤erences in university coverage, we cannot directly use the
survey information in the regressions. However, as a rst look at this prediction, we include
in the baseline specication interaction terms between the inventor royalty share and dummy
variables for the rst and fourth quartiles of the size of the TLO relative to faculty (the reference
point are the middle two quartiles). The results are given in columns (4) and (8) of Table 5.
There is some support for the prediction of the gatekeeper e¤ect in private universities, as shown
by the positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction term involving the fourth quartile.
The point estimate implies that moving from the middle two quartiles to the upper quartile of
TLO size would increase the responsiveness to royalty incentives in private universities from
3.97 to 5.60 (= 3.97+1.63). There is no such evidence for public universities, which suggests
that size is not closely related to e¤ectiveness in public university TLOs, on the average.
Finally, as explained in Section 2, in constructing the inventor royalty share we included
both direct cash paid to the inventor and royalties used to support his research laboratory
where he has direct control rights. This approach assumes that the inventor gives equal weight
to both types of returns. Whether this assumption is reasonable depends on the importance of
intrinsic (research) motivation and peer recognition for university scientists. Support for the
research lab may be valued simply because the scientist values research activity for its own
sake, and/or because he values peer recognition that comes from the resulting research output.
If this is so, then royalties that nance the research lab should have an incentive e¤ect, possibly
even larger than the pecuniary incentives of cash royalties. If intrinsic motivation and/or peer
recognition do not matter, then only the cash royalties should provide incentives.
To test this idea, we decompose the inventor royalty share into its two components: the
cash royalty share and the laboratory share (with control rights). The two shares are separately
entered into the baseline specication with sorting and the presample patents variable for
unobserved heterogeneity. For private universities, the estimated coe¢ cient on the cash royalty
share is 4.15 with a standard error of 1.61, while the coe¢ cient on the lab share is 8.08 with
a standard error of 2.78. We strongly reject the hypothesis that only cash matters scientists
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strongly respond also to research support, which points to an important role for intrinsic
motivation. While the point estimate of the incentive e¤ect of lab support is larger than for
cash, we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that they are equal (p-value of the t-test
is 0.12). The results for public universities point in the same direction but are statistically
weaker. The estimated coe¢ cients on the cash royalty share and lab share are 2.03 (s.e. =
1.50) and 2.55 (s.e.= 2.34). This evidence that university scientists appear to be motivated by
royalties used to support the inventors research support, as well as cash royalties, is important
for the design of university royalty sharing schemes.32
5.3 Analysis of Robustness
In this section we discuss the robustness of the empirical results for the baseline model, given
in columns (3) and (7) in Table 5, to various specication changes. In each case, we focus
attention on how the specication changes a¤ect the coe¢ cients on the key incentive variables;
the coe¢ cients of the other variables are suppressed for brevity.
5.3.1 Outliers
We begin with the concern that the results on the incentive e¤ect may be driven by outliers
in the distribution of license income. Like most measures of the value of innovation (Schanker-
man, 1998; Harho¤, Narin, Scherer and Vopel, 1999; Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2005), license
income is highly skewed, with relatively few universities making large revenues from their tech-
nology transfer activities. The concern is that the appearance of a royalty incentive e¤ect may
simply be due to the fact that the top performing universities happen to have relatively high
inventor royalty shares. This does not appear to be the case, however. The top technology
transfer universities, measured in terms of average license revenue per faculty, do not have
especially high inventor royalty shares. For example, the top two universities in average rev-
enues per faculty are Columbia and Stanford, which have royalty shares of 49 and 33 percent,
respectively, compared to the sample mean of 45 percent). The top decile of universities have
mean royalty share of 47 percent.
32Of course, part of the value to the scientist of support for her research lab may come from future royalties
on new inventions. Thus we may be overstating the importance of intrinsic motivation. More generally, this
points to the di¢ culty in distinguishing between the two types of motivation.
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A second concern is that the average incentive e¤ect may be driven primarily by a
small group, rather than the bulk, of universities. To address this concern, we re-estimate the
baseline model using quantile regression to examine the incentive e¤ects at di¤erent parts of the
distribution of license income This method estimates the e¤ect of royalty shares on the quantiles
(rather than the mean) of the distribution of license income, conditional on all the control
variables. Table 6 summarises the estimated incentive and sorting e¤ects for the di¤erent
quartiles. For private universities, the incentives e¤ects are present and statistically signicant
for all three quartiles of the distribution, though they are larger in the higher quartiles. In
public universities, the incentive e¤ects are only statistically signicant in the lowest quartile
of the distribution and, as before, much smaller than for private universities. This evidence
suggests that, while there are variations in the magnitude of the royalty incentive e¤ect, it does
not appear that the average incentive e¤ects we estimated in the baseline model were simply
due to strong e¤ects at the top end of the distribution and no e¤ects elsewhere.33
5.3.2 Alternative Specications for Sorting
The baseline results in Table 5 were based on the assumption that a university competes for
faculty with the two nearest neighbors in the quality ranking, one above and one below its own
position in the distribution of average scientic publications per faculty. In Table 7 we examine
the results for alternative assumptions specically, we let the number of competing universities
vary from two (as in Table 5) to eight. For private universities, we nd that increasing the
number of competitors reduces the estimated royalty incentive e¤ect by about 25 percent, but it
remains large in absolute terms and generally statistically signicant. In addition, the estimated
impact of sorting (coe¢ cient on the competitorsroyalty rate) is reasonably robust, but it is not
statistically signicant for larger values of the number of competitors. For public universities,
the point estimates of the incentive e¤ect are nearly identical for di¤erent assumptions, but
they remain statistically insignicant.
It is important to emphasise that we are almost surely measuring the mean royalty
33 It is also worth noting that our earlier nding that the TLO is, on average, more e¤ective in private than in
public universities is conrmed by quantile regression. For private universities, the estimated elasticity of license
income with respect to TLO size is 0.44, 0.47 and 0.62 for the rst, second and third quartiles, respectively, and
all are highly signicant. For public universities, the estimates are either insignicant or negative.
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incentive at competing universities with measurement error, which suggests that our estimates
of 2 are subject to attenuation bias. In part this measurement error arises because we are
averaging over all elds when ranking universities by citations to scientic publications. It is
likely that the rankings of universities are highly varied across elds, especially once one gets
out of the top few universities. The appropriate method for identifying a given universitys
relevant competitors requires knowing how universities strategically set their royalty sharing
arrangements (e.g. whether they target specic universities or faculties): This requires more
detailed knowledge of the actual decision-making, and this may vary across universities. In this
context, case study evidence could be very useful.
5.3.3 Alternative Controls for Unobserved Heterogeneity
In the baseline regressions, we used the pre-sample mean of patent citations to control for
unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., the mean number of citations until 2001 to all patents that
were applied for in the period 1975-90 for each university). In Table 8 we examine robustness
of the results to alternative specications of the pre-sample control specically to using patent
counts rather than citations, and to including dummy variables for cases of zero patent counts
or citations. Columns (1) and (5) replicate the results of the baseline specication from Table
5. For private universities, we nd that both the coe¢ cients of royalty share and the sorting
e¤ect of competitorsroyalty shares are robust to using pre-sample patent count data instead
of patent citations and to including dummies for zero patent counts or cites. As before, the
pre-sample controls are strongly signicant. For public universities, the point estimates of the
royalty incentive e¤ects are also robust but, as before, not statistically signicant. We also
experimented with di¤erent pre-sample periods 1980-90 and 1985-90 and found that the
results were qualitatively similar, if somewhat less strong (results not reported for brevity).
5.3.4 Other checks
We performed three additional specication checks but, for the sake of brevity, we omit the re-
gression results. First, the dependent variable in all the preceding regressions, licensing income,
includes the cashed-in equity value of start-ups in which the university holds some stake. Since
the sample period (1991-1999) includes several years during the period of irrational exuber-
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ance, we might get a distortion if private universities were more likely to endorse taking equity
than their public counterparts and equity was hyper-valued. To check for this possibility,
we re-estimated the baseline specication using license income minus cashed-in equity as the
dependent variable. This variable can only be constructed for the subperiod 1996-99, so we
lose more than half the observations. For private universities, the estimated coe¢ cient on the
royalty share is 5.13 (s.e.=1.76) and the coe¢ cient on the competitorsroyalty share is -3.08
(s.e.=1.43). For public universities the estimated coe¢ cients on these two royalty shares are
2.08 (s.e.=1.94) and -2.81 (s.e.=1.87), respectively. Thus our key empirical results are robust
to excluding cashed-in equity value in licensing income.
Second, we used alternative measures of the quality of university faculty, specically the
NRC scholarly quality score, the number of publications per faculty, and the average faculty
salary at the university. The estimates of the coe¢ cient on the royalty share, as well as the
other control variables, are very similar to those in the baseline specication using citations per
faculty as the quality measure. For example, using the scholarly quality score the estimates of
( + 1) are 4.33 (s.e.=2.06) and 1.96 (s.e.=1.43) and the estimates of 2 are -2.71 (s.e.=1.31)
and -1.25 (s.e.=1.32) for private and public universities, respectively.
Third, we allowed for industry and publicly-funded R&D to have di¤erent e¤ects on
licensing income. The results show that publicly-funded R&D has a positive and signicant
e¤ect on license revenue in public universities only, with an elasticity of about 0.6.34 By
contrast, industry-nanced R&D has no signicant e¤ect on license income in either private or
pubic universities. This is exactly what one would expect since the bulk of such funding comes
from contract R&D with free licensing provisions (i.e., ex ante R&D funds are given in place of
ex post licensing income). The estimated coe¢ cients on the royalty shares, and on the other
regressors, are nearly identical to the baseline case.
5.4 Incentive e¤ects: Impact on the quantity and quality of inventions
License revenue per faculty depends both on the number of inventions and their value. As
pointed out in Section 3, the model predicts that both the applied research e¤ort directed at
34Payne and Siow (2003) analyze the e¤ect of federal funding on university research. Using a sample of 68
research universities, they conclude that increasing federal research funding results in more, but not necessarily
higher quality, research output.
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the number of projects and the e¤ort on the quality of projects should be increasing functions
of the royalty share. The model allows us to distinguish between the quantity (n) and the
quality (v) components of the royalty share e¤ect on license revenue, even with university
level data. Let L be the the expected number of licenses obtained from Fn inventions, L =
Fn(z(s; ))
h
1 G

v
 (q(s;))
i
: Using (1) and observed revenues R = Freu; we can write
R = L  (q(s; ))E

"j" > v
 (q(s; ))

eu (5)
As this equation makes clear, if the royalty share a¤ects the quality of inventions, it should a¤ect
license revenues even after controlling for the number of licenses. The elasticity of revenues
with respect to licenses should be approximately one.
Table 9 presents results for a log version of equation (5). We measure L by the stock
of cumulative number of active licenses, which is reported by AUTM. This is the relevant
measure since license income ows are generated by the existing stock of active licenses. Data
on the latter are available from 1995 so, for purposes of comparison, columns (1) and (4)
present the baseline specication for the same period 1995-99. Turning to the second column,
when we control for L the estimated e¤ect of royalty shares on revenues declines but does not
disappear.35 This is particularly true in private universities, but less so in public ones where
the incentive e¤ect was not signicantly di¤erent from zero to start with. Raising the royalty
share at private universities by one percentage point will generate 4.3 percent more license
revenue, given the same number of licenses. As the total e¤ect of such a change in royalty
shares is higher about 5.0 percent in column (1) it follows that the number of inventions
is also a¤ected by the royalty share. This is seen more directly in columns (3) and (6), which
present the regressions of the (ow) number of licenses executed against royalty incentives and
the various control variables. The royalty share has a signicant e¤ect on the ow number of
licenses executed for private universities, but essentially no e¤ect for public ones.
The main implication of this analysis is that the quality channel is more important than
the quantity channel in private universities. In public universities, however, royalty share has
an overall very weak e¤ect because neither quantity nor quality seems to be a¤ected by royalty
35The coe¢ cient on logL is not very precisely estimated in private universities but one cannot reject the
hypothesis that it equals one. Also notice that faculty size does not appear in equation (5) once L is included.
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incentives.
The use of quantity measures in these regression may introduce measurement error be-
cause of the possibility that faculty do not report all their inventions to the TLO. However,
this is likely to bias the e¤ect of royalty shares downward in the revenue regression.36 Thus
any possible non-reporting bias will reinforce our conclusion that the incentive e¤ect of royalty
sharing works predominantly by increasing the quality (commercial value) of inventions, rather
than the number of inventions.
5.5 Incentive e¤ects: Interactions with faculty quality and tenure
We next examine whether the incentive e¤ect of royalty shares varies with faculty quality or
with the extent to which faculty is tenured. First, as we discussed in Section 5.2, there is
evidence in these data that intrinsic motivation/peer recognition do matter, as suggested by
the fact that royalties for research lab support have an incentive e¤ect. It is often argued that
such motivation may be particularly strong for faculty at more prestigious institutions. In
the model this takes the form of a lower marginal utility of license revenue in higher quality
universities. To test this, we include in the baseline specication of the model interactions
terms between the inventor royalty share and dummy variables for the lowest, the middle two,
and the highest quartiles of the citations per faculty distribution.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 10 summarise the results for the royalty incentive variables.
In support of the popular view, we nd that the incentive e¤ect of royalty shares declines with
university quality. For private universities, the estimated coe¢ cient declines from 6.8 in the
rst quartile of the quality distribution to 4.5 in the fourth quartile. In public universities, we
nd a similar pattern: the universities in the bottom quality quartile are responsive to royalty
incentives whereas higher quality public universities do not exhibit any signicant response to
royalties. This last nding is particularly interesting, since the baseline estimate of the incentive
e¤ect for public universities (with quality quartiles pooled) was not signicantly di¤erent from
36Let N and N = N (1  ') denote the true and observed number of disclosures, where ' 2 [0; 1] is the
rate of misreporting. When ' = 0 faculty reports all inventions to the TLO. Let L and L denote the true and
observed number of licenses. They di¤er only because Nand N di¤er, so L = L(1   '): When log L is used
instead of logL as a regressor, it adds   log(1  ') to the error in the regression. If Cov('; s) = 0 there is no
bias. However, if Cov('; s) < 0, i.e., misreporting decreases as the inventors royalty share increases, then s and
-log(1 ') are negatively correlated and we get a downward bias in the estimated coe¢ cients of both s and log
L in the regressions in columns (2) and (5) of Table 9.
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zero (Table 5).
Second, if there is a trade-o¤ between doing commercially-oriented research and generat-
ing academic publications, we would expect untenured faculty members to be less responsive to
royalty shares than tenured members because the marginal cost of not publishing is higher for
untenured faculty.37 To test this, we include interactions terms between the inventor royalty
share and dummy variables for the lowest, the middle two, and highest quartile of the tenure
distribution (the percentage of tenured faculty at each university).38 As columns (2) and (4)
in Table 10 show, there is some support for the hypothesis in public universities. The incentive
e¤ect of royalty shares is signicant and positive in the top quartile of the tenure distribution,
but not in the lower three quartiles. However, we do not nd any support for the hypothesis
in private universities.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides evidence that U.S. universities which give higher royalty shares to fac-
ulty scientists appear to generate greater license income, controlling for a variety of observed
characteristics and using pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the potential
endogeneity of royalty shares. We nd that scientists respond both to royalties in the form
of cash and research lab support, suggesting that both pecuniary and intrinsic (research) mo-
tivations play a role. The incentive e¤ects appear to be larger in private universities than in
public ones, and our survey evidence suggests this may be related to di¤erences in the use of
performance pay, government constraints and the importance of local development objectives
in technology licensing o¢ ces. There is some evidence that royalty incentives work both by
increasing faculty e¤ort and by sorting scientists across universities.
This empirical evidence strongly suggests that royalty sharing arrangements and, more
generally incentives within universities, have real e¤ects. Universities are likely to consider
a host of factors when choosing or changing these arrangements, but to our knowledge there
37Levin and Stephan (1991) make a related point regarding the e¤ect of age on a researchers academic
productivity.
38Source: NSF WebCASPAR Database System (http://caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar). The information of tenure
refers to all faculty rather than just to those in hard sciences, which is what we would like to measure.
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is no economics literature on these issues. We need to understand the multiple objectives in
universities and TLOs, the trade-o¤s among them, and the way in which university governance
and other constraints a¤ect the use of high-powered incentives to achieve their goals. At
the same time, we need to develop a more complete model of university competition and
strategic interaction. It would help in building such a model to have case study evidence on
the actual decision-making process in universities for setting royalty shares and other non-
pecuniary incentives.
We found that being in a high-tech area is associated with better licensing performance,
and that private universities appear to be more e¤ective than public ones at exploiting this
potential. That local demand conditions matter at all is somewhat surprising given the global
nature of technology markets. Understanding the factors underlying this nding is worthy of
further investigation, because they are likely to relate to how university technology transfer
should best be organised. For example, in the U.S. one striking feature of the technology
transfer industry is the lack of specialisation and competition. Currently, each university
TLO has exclusive rights to commercialise all inventions generated by the university. But
TLOs could specialize by technology area and serve multiple universities across geographic
markets, and there could be elements of either ex ante or ex post competition. The benets of
such alternative structures will depend on the strength of local (high tech) demand e¤ects, as
well as on the strength of economies of scale and scope.
Finally, we want to emphasise that there are natural limits to what aggregate data can
deliver. Micro data on academic scientists have the potential to allow us to separate the e¤ort
and sorting e¤ects of royalty sharing. This is important because, as pointed out earlier, if
higher royalties work only through a sorting e¤ect then there are no aggregate gains (apart
from those associated with better matching), whereas if higher royalty sharing leads scientists
to exert more e¤ort then social, as well as private, gains are increased.
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Appendix 1: Data
A Variable Denitions
A.1 Data from AUTM Licensing Surveys 1991-99.
1. Licensing income includes license issue fees, payments under options, annual minimums,
running royalties, termination payments, the amount of equity received when cashed-in,
and software and biological material end-user license fees equal to $1,000 or more. License
income includes net transfers of license income from other institutions.
2. TLO Size is the number of person(s) employed in the TLO whose duties are specically
involved with the licensing and patenting processes in either full or fractional allocation.
Because this information is not available for 1991, we used the data for 1992 to measure
size in 1991. The change in the point estimates is minimal but their precision increases
due to the larger number of observations.
3. TLO Age is measured using the year when then TLO was established as reported by
the AUTM surveys. When the foundation year was on 1991 or later we recoded the
foundation year to be the rst year when the TLO size was larger than 0.5one half
full-time equivalent professional employed.
4. R&D funding includes the total amount of research support committed to the university
that was related to license/options agreements.
A.2 Data from 1993 National Survey of Graduate Faculty
The Survey provides data on doctoral programs that participated in the 1993 National Research
Council (NRC) National Survey of Graduate Faculty (appendix K on engineering programs,
appendix L on life science programs, and appendix N on biological sciences).
1. Science Fields: 23 doctoral programs were aggregated into 6 science elds. We used
the shares of faculty employed in each eld to proxy for the research orientation of the
university. The elds are:
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(a) Biomedical and Genetics - biochemical/molecular biology, cell and development bi-
ology, biomedical engineering and molecular and general genetics
(b) Other Biological Sciences - neurosciences, pharmacology, physiology and ecology/evolution
and behavior
(c) Computer Science includes only the department of computer sciences
(d) Chemical Science - chemistry and chemical engineering
(e) Engineering - aerospace, civil engineering, electrical engineering, industrial engineer-
ing, material science, and mechanical engineering
(f) Physical Sciences - astrophysics/astronomy, geosciences, mathematics, oceanogra-
phy, physics, and statistics/biomedical statistics.
2. Faculty Size is the total number of faculty in the 23 doctoral programs as reported in the
Survey.
3. Quality measures:
(a) Citations per faculty : ratio of total number of program citations in the period 1988-
92 to the number of program faculty.
(b) Publications per faculty: ratio of total number of program publications in the period
1988-92 to the number of program faculty.
(c) Scholarly quality index of program faculty is the trimmed mean of the responses
received in the Survey for each doctoral program. Scores were converted to a scale
of 0 to 5, with 0 denoting Not su¢ cient for doctoral educationand 5 denoting ve
Distinguished.
All these quality measures were aggregated to the university level using faculty weights.
In some instances, a university appears more than once in the NRC le because the NRC
has information on two or even three units of the same department, e.g., statistics and
biostatistics or meteorology and geology (in geosciences). In these instances we averaged
their quality measures weighting each unit by its share in the total faculty number of both
units combined. In other instances, a university appears more than once in the NRC le
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because the NRC has information on two or more campuses (e.g., California, Rutgers,
etc.). In these instances we averaged their quality measures weighting each campus by
its share in the total faculty number of all campuses combined.
A.3 Data from TLOs Websites
Inventors royalty share. This information was downloaded from the websites of each univer-
sity technology licensing o¢ ces during the summer of 2001. The net income received by the
university from licensing an invention is distributed between the inventor and the university.
The university allocates its share to various units such as the inventors laboratory, department
or college. The criterion we use for identifying the inventor share is that the inventor must
gain either cash ow rights or direct control rights over the income. Thus, when the university
intellectual property policy states that the share accruing to the lab was under the control of
the inventor, we added it to the inventors share, but otherwise we did not. Royalty shares
were computed out of net license income after deducting direct licensing expenses from gross
income. We also made an adjustment for the TLOs overhead rate, when it was reported.
B Data Selection Process
Starting with the nine les containing the Association of University Technology Managers
(AUTM) Annual Licensing Surveys for 1991-99 we compiled a list of 209 institutions with li-
censing income and disclosure data for all or part of the 1991-99 period. These institutions
include American and Canadian universities, medical research institutes and patent manage-
ment rms. The size and quality measures from the 1993 National Survey of Graduate Faculty
conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) are available for universities with doctoral
programs only. This reduces the sample of institutions with AUTM and NRC data to 146.
Merging with the royalty share distribution data further reduced the number of institutions
with AUTM, NRC and royalty share data to 102.
C Structure of the Data
We have panel data on 102 universities with non-missing license income data ranging from
T = 1 to T = 9 years. We start with a total of 749 university-year observations with non-
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missing license income data. Tables 13 rely on the full sample of 102 universities but the
sample used in Tables 5-10 is smaller because of missing data on some of the regressors and
observations with zero license income (we use the log of license income). This sample comprises
96 universities (31 private and 65 public) and 708 observations. Assigning a zero value to the
dependent variable of the universities with zero license revenue, and including them in the
regression, did not change the parameter estimates.
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Appendix 2: Comnparative Statics
The scientists problem is
max
e;z;q
V (sr(z; q); p(e; z; q))  C(e; z; q)
We also assume that the utility function is separable in license income and publications, V12 = 0:
The rst order conditions are
e : V2pe   Ce = 0
z : sV1rz + V2pz   Cz = 0
q : sV1rq + V2pq   Cq = 0
where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the di¤erent arguments. Di¤erenti-
ating totally yields 24 
ee 
ez 
eq
ez 
zz 
zq

eq 
zq 
qq
3524 dedz
dq
35 =  
24 0 0
zs 
z

qs 
q
35 ds
d

where

ee = V22p
2
e + V2pee   Cee

zz = sV1rzz + s
2V11r
2
z + V22p
2
z + V2pzz   Czz

qq = sV1rqq + s
2V11r
2
q + V22p
2
q + V2pqq   Cqq

ez = V22pepz + V2pez   Cez

eq = V22pepq + V2peq   Ceq

zq = V22pzpq + V2pzq   Czq

zs = V1rz + s
2V11rr

z = sV1rz + s
2V11rzr

qs = V1rq + s
2V11rrq

q = sV1rq + s
2V11rqr
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Second order conditions imply 
ii < 0; 
ii
jj 
2ij > 0 for i 6= j 2 (e; z; q) and det
 < 0.
Solving we get the following comparative statics results:
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Appendix 3: Adaptation of Pre-sample Scaling Method
The model is
yit = xit + i + uit
where i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T; y is the logarithm of license income, x includes both time
varying and invariant regressors (the latter includes, for most universities, the royalty share),
and we only assume E(uitjxit; xit 1; :::; i) = 0 for all t: The unobserved heterogeneity i
may be correlated with royalty share and other variables. We use the pre-sample scaling
methoddeveloped by Blundell, Gri¢ th and van Reenen (1999), which amounts to constructing
a su¢ cient statistic for i based on pre-sample information on the dependent variable and then
directly controlling for it in the regression.39 They develop the method for a (nonlinear) patent
count model. Below we sketch how the method works in our context and how we must adapt
it for our purposes.
Let J denote the number of pre-sample observations. Then
p lim
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
yit
!
= p lim
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
(xit + i + uit)
!
= p lim
J!1
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
xit
!
+ i
The left-hand-side of this equation is the limit of the pre-sample mean of license income for
university i:
Using a linear projection argument, we can express each of the observable regressors xj
as a linear function of the unobservable i and an error cijt uncorrelated with i :
xijt = 0 + ji + cijt; j = 1; : : : ; k
with E(cijt) = 0 and E(icijt) = 0:
Note that if all the 0js are zero then there is no endogeneity problem. Thus, if xijt is
endogenous at least one of the js is non-zero. We assume that the projection parameters are
39They also show that one can use pre-sample information on the regressors, but we do not have such infor-
mation.
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constant over time.40 This representation implies
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
xit =
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
kX
j=1
xijt
= 0
kX
j=1
j + i
0@ kX
j=1
jj
1A+ 1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
kX
j=1
cijtj
Provided a law of large numbers apply to 1J+1
P J
t=0 cijt so that p lim
J!1
1
J+1
P J
t=0 cijt = 0, we get
p lim
J!1
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
xit = 0
kX
j=1
j + 1i + p lim
J!1
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
cijtj
= 0
kX
j=1
j + 1i
where 1 =
Pk
j=1 jj :
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We can then write
myi  p lim
J!1
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
yit
!
= 0
kX
j=1
j + (1 + 1) i
and solving for i;
i =  
0
Pk
j=1 j
1 + 1
+
1
1 + 1
myi
This equation says that the pre-sample mean of log license income is a su¢ cient statistic
for i: Substituting into the original model we get the estimating equation
yit = xit +
1
1 + 1
myi + uit
where the constant term  0
Pk
j=1 j
1+1
is absorbed into the constant term of the original model.
In the actual estimation the pre-sample mean of y is used instead of its probability limit myi:
The problem in our context is that we do not have pre-sample information on license
income. However, we do have pre-sample information on the patenting activity for each uni-
versity. In order to use pre-sample patents instead of pre-sample license income we make the
40This assumption is made to simplify the exposition and it will hold if the x0s are drawn from the same
distribution at every t: The method can be extended to time-varying coe¢ cients under an additional convergence
assumption.
41Note that there are no time-invariant components in cijt they are captured by i and that some weak
serial dependency is possible as long as a law of large numbers can be applied.
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additional assumption that patenting is also a linear function of the unobserved heterogeneity,
: That is, we assume
pit = zit+ i + vit
where p is the log of patents (or patent citations) and the regressors z may have common
components with x: Since the decision by the TLO to patent an invention is based on expected
returns from commercialising the invention, this assumption that patenting depends on  seems
very reasonable.
Retracing the previous steps but using p instead of y; using tildes to denote coe¢ cients
in this derivation for patents, and letting mpi = p lim
J!1
1
J+1
P J
t=0 pit; we have
i =  
e0Pkj=1 j
 + e1 + 1 + e1mpi
and substituting into the original model, we get the estimable equation
yit = xit +
1
 + e1mpi + uit
where the constant term   e0Pkj=1 j+e1 is absorbed into the constant term of the original model.
This is the equation we estimate in the paper, using the pre-sample mean of patents
(or patent citations) instead of its probability limit mpi to control for the correlation with
unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics¹
Mean 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Licensing income ('000s) 4,940 63 463 868 4,029 11,500
Licensing income ('000s) per license² 41 6 12 28 51 99
Faculty size 320 89 134 276 479 576
Citations per faculty³ 74 20 32 68 114 134
Publications per faculty³ 9 3 6 9 10 13
Scholarly quality (0-5) 3.4 2.2 2.7 3.5 4.0 4.5
Average size of TLO 3.2 0.4 1.2 2.1 4.0 8.3
Age of TLO in 1999 (years) 16 7 11 15 18 23
Mean 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Licensing income ('000s) 2,905 45 155 539 2,206 5,768
Licensing income ('000s) per license² 55 5 10 17 31 65
Faculty size 380 53 145 289 514 756
Citations per faculty³ 36 9 18 28 47 62
Publications per faculty³ 7 3 5 7 8 10
Scholarly quality (0-5) 2.8 1.9 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.8
Average size of TLO 3.1 0.6 1.0 1.7 3.1 6.5
Age of TLO in 1999 (years) 16 7 8 12 17 30
Notes:
¹ Statistics computed on the time-averaged data for each of university. Constant 2000 dollars, using GDP deflator.
² Licensing income in year t divided by the cumulative number of active licenses through year t.
³ During 1988-92.
Private Universities (n=34)
Public Universities (n=68)
Table 2. Distribution of Inventor Royalty Shares (percentage)¹
Mean 10% 50% 90% Min Max
Linear Schedules (n=58)
   Private Universities 39 25 40 50 21 50
   Public Universities 42 30 40 50 25 65
Nonlinear Schedules (n=44)²
   Private Universities 51 34 49 64 34 97
   Public Universities 51 38 49 70 20 89
   by Income Interval (Private and Public):
   0-10,000 53 40 50 75 20 100
   10,000-50,000 45 25 50 50 20 93
   50,000-100,000 41 25 44 50 20 85
   100,000-300,000 35 25 33 43 20 85
   300,000-500,000 33 25 30 40 20 85
   500,000-1 million 32 21 30 40 20 85
   Over 1 million 30 20 30 40 15 85
Notes:
¹Time-averaged royalty shares are used for the 11 universities that changed their shares during 1991-99.
² Expected royalty shares for nonlinear schedules are computed using kernel density weights, as described in the text.
Table 3. Inventor Royalty Shares (percentage) by University Characteristics1
Faculty Size Citations TLO Size TLO Age Faculty Share Faculty Share
per Faculty per Faculty in Bio-medicine2 in Engineering3
First Quartile 46 50 44 46 48 47
Second Quartile 48 45 43 43 41 46
Third Quartile 41 42 43 47 41 39
Fourth Quartile 41 38 49 37 44 43
F test (p-value) 0.6 0.31 0.82 0.51 0.76 0.7
Faculty Size Citations TLO Size TLO Age Faculty Share Faculty Share
per Faculty per Faculty in Bio-medicine2 in Engineering3
First Quartile 48 44 40 46 44 49
Second Quartile 45 49 51 47 40 43
Third Quartile 45 44 45 49 48 44
Fourth Quartile 46 47 45 41 51 46
F test (p-value) 0.89 0.76 0.22 0.45 0.22 0.78
Notes:
1 Using 1996 data for time-varying variables.
2 Bio-medicine includes biochemical/molecular biology, cell and development biology, biomedical engineering and molecular and general genetics
3 Engineering includes aerospace, civil engineering, electrical engineering, industrial engineering, material science, and mechanical engineering
Private Universities
Public Universities
Table 4. Incentives, Constraints and Objectives in Private and Public TLO's¹
Private Public P-value of Equality
Universities Universities of Means Test
1. Faculty Awareness of Incentives
  % responding "yes" 96.4 91.7 0.41
2. University Rewards Technology Transfer
  % responding "yes" 15.4 9.4 0.42
3. Performace-based Pay (merit or bonuses)
  % responding "yes" 79 49 0.007
4. Government constraints on:
  % reporting "important" or "very important"
  Choice of license partners 0 23 < 0.001
  Setting license contract terms 0 19 < 0.001
  License confidentiality 0 27 < 0.001
  Use of equity stakes 3.5 23 0.024
  University liability/indemnification 18 75 0.050
  Dispute resolution mechanisms 3.6 49 0.038
5. Objectives
  % reporting "important" or "very important"
  Number of licenses 100 97 0.380
  License income 93 88 0.440
  Promoting local/regional development 57 88 0.001
Notes:
¹Based on survey conducted by the authors. Numbers of public and private universities are 73 and 28, respectively.
Table 5 . License Revenue Equation (eq.(3)): Baseline Specifications
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Royalty Share 5.84*** 5.26*** 4.52** 3.97** 2.30* 2.32* 1.93 1.75
2.16 1.98 2.04 1.97 1.35 1.36 1.46 1.41
Competitors' Royalty Share -- -3.37** -2.54* -2.02* -- -0.52 -1.06 -1.18
1.38 1.35 1.21 1.51 1.42 1.42
Royalty Share x Dummy for -0.23 0.95
1st Quartlile of TLO /faculty 0.94 1.06
Royalty Share x Dummy for 1.63** -0.54
4st Quartlile of TLO /faculty 0.80 0.82
Log (Average Patent Cites) -- -- 0.53** 0.52** -- -- 0.41*** 0.44***
0.24 0.25 0.12 0.12
Log (TLO/Faculty) 0.56** 0.61*** 0.55** 0.28 -0.09 -0.10 -0.24 -0.08
0.26 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
Age TLO 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Age TLO squared -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Log (Faculty Size) 0.65 0.89* 0.74 0.89* 1.25*** 1.26*** 0.74*** 0.64***
0.58 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.23
Publication Cites/ Faculty 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Log (R&D/Faculty) 0.15 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.53** 0.53** 0.63*** 0.67***
0.36 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24
Medical School Dummy 1.81* 1.17 0.55 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.18
0.94 0.80 0.93 0.85 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.33
High-Tech, first quartile -0.39 -0.27 0.36 0.62 0.54 0.56 0.75** 0.825**
0.56 0.58 0.72 0.66 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.34
High-Tech, fourth quartile 0.69* 0.75** 0.64* 0.57* 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.53
0.39 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.57
R2 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.67
Number of Observations 246 246 246 246 462 462 462 462
Notes: Year dummies and faculty shares in six fields are included in all regressions. Standard errors 
 clustered by university in small numerals. 
*** , **, * significant at the 1, 5, and 10 % level,  respectively.
Private Universities Public Universities
Dependent variable: log license income
Table 6 . Robustness to "Outliers"
1 2 3 5 6 7
Quartile Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75
Royalty Share 3.88*** 4.06*** 8.24*** 1.34* 0.31 0.80
0.98 1.33 2.20 0.68 0.66 0.79
Competitors' Royalty Share -2.79*** -1.95 0.39 -0.68 -0.64 -1.24
0.91 1.28 1.91 0.88 0.67 1.08
R2 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.48 0.46 0.46
Number of Observations 246 246 246 462 462 462
Notes: All other control variables appearing inTable 5 are included in all regressions, but their coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in small numerals.
*** , **, * significant at the 1, 5, and 10 % level,  respectively.
Dependent variable: log license income
Private Universities Public Universities
Table 7 . Robustness to Number of Competing Universities in Sorting
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of Competing Universities 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8
Royalty Share 4.52** 3.61* 3.36 3.94* 1.93 1.91 1.97 1.93
2.04 2.09 2.36 2.38 1.46 1.47 1.48 1.47
Competitors' Royalty Share -2.54* -3.24 -4.80 -3.09 -1.06 -1.33 1.52 0.70
1.35 2.42 3.54 5.23 1.42 1.70 2.46 2.55
R2 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Number of Observations 246 246 246 246 462 462 462 462
All other control variables appearing inTable 5 are included in all regressions, but their coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
Standard errors clustered by unviersity in small numerals.
*** , **, * significant at the 1, 5, and 10 % level,  respectively.
Notes: Competing universities are defined by their ranking of publication citations per faculty. 
Dependent variable: log license income
Private Universities Public Universities
Table 8 . Robustness to Alterntive Pre-sample Controls
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Royalty Share 4.52** 4.50** 5.28*** 5.05*** 1.93 1.92 2.24 2.27
2.04 2.03 1.95 1.94 1.46 1.43 1.55 1.55
Competitors' Royalty Share -2.54* -2.69* -3.19** -3.16** -1.06 -0.73 -0.85 -0.98
1.35 1.36 1.39 1.38 1.42 1.43 1.4 1.43
Log (Average Patent Cites) 0.53** 0.41 0.41*** 0.52***
0.24 0.26 0.12 0.12
Dummy for Zero Cites -- -3.09*** -- 1.22**
0.82 0.56
Log (Average Patents) -- -- 0.41 0.38 -- -- 0.60*** 0.61***
0.36 0.36 0.23 0.22
Dummy for Zero Patents -3.84*** 0.87
0.70 0.88
R2 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66
Number of Observations 246 246 246 246 462 462 462 462
All other control variables appearing inTable 5 are included in all regressions, but their coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
Standard errors clustered by unviersity in small numerals.
*** , **, * significant at the 1, 5, and 10 % level,  respectively.
Notes: Competing universities are defined by their ranking of publication citations per faculty. 
Dependent variable: log license income
Public UniversitiesPrivate Universities
Table 9 . Incentive Effects on the Quantity vs Quality of Invention
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dep. Variable Log Licenses Log Licenses
Log (Stock of Licences) -- 0.46 -- -- 0.57*** --
0.30 0.18
Royalty Share 5.05** 4.31* 2.20** 2.24 2.06 0.42
2.21 2.31 1.06 1.63 1.70 0.55
Competitors' Royalty Share -4.27*** -2.33 -2.39*** -2.51 -2.36 -0.28
1.34 1.77 0.81 1.62 1.58 0.50
R2 0.81 0.79 0.86 0.65 0.66 0.81
Number of Observations 137 137 137 265 265 265
Notes: All other control variables appearing in Table 5 are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not reported for brevity 
except for regressions 2 and 5 which exclude Log (Faculty Size).
Standard errors clustered by university in small numerals.
*** , **, * significant at the 1, 5, and 10 % level,  respectively.
Private Universities Public Universities
Log Revenues Log Revenues
Table 10. Interactions between Incentives Effects and the Quality and Tenure of University Faculty
1 2 3 4
Quality 
quartiles
Tenure 
quartiles
Quality quartiles Tenure 
quartiles
Determinants of Incentives
Royalty Share (in 1st quartile ) 6.84** 5.08** 3.65** 1.80
2.99 2.01 1.85 1.76
Royalty Share (in 2nd & 3rd  quartiles) 4.81** 4.31** 1.62 1.21
2.10 1.74 1.03 1.20
Royalty Share (4th quartile) 4.51** 3.22 0.23 3.15**
2.00 1.96 1.19 1.62
Competitors' Royalty Share -2.41* -1.09 -0.08 -0.38
1.40 1.65 1.26 1.12
R2 0.79 0.81 0.68 0.69
Number of Observations 246 246 462 462
Notes: All other control variables appearing in Table 5 are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
Standard errors clustered by university in small numerals.
*** , **, * significant at the 1, 5, and 10 % level,  respectively.
Private Universities Public Universities
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